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should not be overruled and strained constructions placed
upon other cases in order to reach a desired result. As l
stated at the beginning of this dissent, it is impossible to
distinguish the Brooks case from the one at bar, and any
attempt to do so can lead to nothing but confusion.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7,
1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

[L. A. No. 22811.

In Bank.

lVIar. 12, 1954.]

MOHGAN A. STIVERS et al., Appellants, v. DEP AR'l'MENT OF EMPLOYMEN'l' et al., Respondents.
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Excluded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Services performed by packing-house labor constitutes "agricultural labor" within meaning of Unemployment
Insurance Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), excluding such labor from operation
of act, only if services are performed in employ of owner or
tenant of farm on which materials in their raw or natural
state are produced and if such services are carried on as an
incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from
commercial operations. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43,
amending rule 7.1 of Department of Employment.)
[2a, 2b] Id.-Excl-aded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Partners owning citrus groves and a packing-house which serves
public to extent of 20 per cent of its total fruit-packing operations, the remaining 80 per cent coming from partners' own
groves, cannot avoid commercial aspect of packing-house and
their consequent liability for unemployment contributions on
premise that principal pmpose of such house is to facilitate
marketing of crops from their own groves; the test under
Unemployment Insurance Act for determining whether activities of their. employees is agricultural is not principal purpose
of enterprise, but whether services performed by employees
are carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations.
[3] !d.-Excluded Employments- Mode for Determining.-Provisions in Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1945, pp. 1486,
2230; see Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42) for segregation of
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief
-Insurance Act,§ 16.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Unemployment Insurance, § 15.
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employee's services on percentage basis and classification of
aggregate employment by reference to how "one-half or more"
of employee's time is spent, and requiring employer to keep
accurate records in segregation of exempt and nonexempt employment, were adopted as a reasonable method for determining whether a speeific employee or group of employees,
engaged part of time in exempt work and part of time in
nonexempt work, is in taxable employment and entitled to
coverage provisions of act; the provisions do not apply in favor
of employer who conducts a single integrated operation having
a definite commercial aspect so as to exempt such employer
from liability for contributions in any period in which commercial phase of such integrated operation may fall below 50
per cent of total operation.
[4] !d.-Excluded Employments-Agricultural Labor.-Mere :fact
that plaintiffs' packing-house is a partnership, the partners
owners of farms, does not render services performed by employees therein "agricultural labor" within meaning of Unemployment Insurance Act on theory that they are in effect
performing services for owners of land; the independent factor
of "commercial nature" of packing-house enterprise, where
this is shown, is sufficient to establish plaintiffs' liability for
unemployment contributions.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Roy L. Herndon, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover unemployment insurance contributions
paid under protest. Judgment for defendants after sustaining their demurrer without leave to amend, affirmed.
Ivan G. McDaniel and Kenneth N. Dellamater for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Irving H. Perluss,
Assistant Attorney General, William L. Shaw and Vincent
P. Lafferty, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
certain unemployment insurance contributions assessed and
paid under protest pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance
Act. (Stats. 1935, p. 1226, as amended; 3 Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 8780d.) The assessments were for the period January 1, 1944, through September 30, 1947, and amounted to
$5,348.20. Plaintiffs pursued all administrative proceedings
prerequisite to the institution of this action. Their claim of
refund is predicated upon the contention that their packing-
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house employees were engaged in exempt "agricultural labor"
and not in commercial activities, which latter activities are
not exempted by the act. The court sustained defendants'
demurrer without leave to amend, and from the ensuing
judgment plaintiffs appeal. The record and applicable legal
principles affecting the construction of the act support the
propriety of the assailed judgment.
It appears from the complaint that four of the Stivers
brothers-Morgan A., Glenn, Howard, and Archie*-were
members of a partnership which owned, among other properties, 357 acres of citrus groves. Morgan A. Stivers was
the managing and operating partner of all properties of the
"four-way partnership." A fifth brother, Raymond K.
Shvers, owned separately an additional 70 acres of citrus
groves. He and the four-way partnership formed a packinghouse partnership, known as the Stivers Packing Company.
During the tax period involved the packing company owned
and operated a packing-house, under the management of
Raymond K. Stivers. All the fruit from the Stivers' grovesthe combined 427 acres-was packed in this packing-house
and constituted 80 per cent of the entire amount of products
handled; the remaining 20 per cent of the total fruit packed
came from the groves of others. Raymond K. Stivers had a
one-third interest in the Stivers Packing Company, and the
four-way partnership had a two-thirds interest. All the cost
of operating the Stivers' groves was paid by the packing company. These groves were charged with their proportionate
expense on the following basis : a credit was allowed for all
receipts from the respective fruit sold, against which was
made a charge per box for packing, plus an additional charge
for the particular operation and maintenance cost, and the
balance then accrued in favor of Raymond K. Stivers or
the four-way partnership· according to the grove accounting.
The packing-house partnership did not operate, maintain or
manage any "non-Stivers" citrus gToves. It is alleged in
the complaint that ''the primary and sole purpose of said
packinghouse partnership was to produce, harvest, pick, sell
and ship citrus fruits'' from the Stivers' groves; but the
general allegation that this was the ''sole'' purpose must
fall before the specific, contradictory allegation that "not
more than 20% of the total fruit packed" came from the
groves of others. The labor here in question involves only
*Now deceased, and his son, .J. B. Stivers, as executor, ,joins as a
plaintiff.
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the services rendered by the employees of the packing-house
partnership working in the packing-house.
Plaintiffs' liability for contributions on the wages paid the
packing-house employees depends on whether or not such
employees may be classified as "agricultural labor." (1] The
Unemployment Insurance Act excludes, without definition,
"agricultural labor" from the term "employment" within
its coverage provisions. The necessary definition for administrative purposes has been supplied by rule of the Department of Employment. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 43, 1 amending rule 7.1 following its interpretation in California Ernp.
Corn. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546,551-553 [165 P.2d 917].) It
thus appears that packing-house labor, in order to be classed
as agricultural, must be ''services performed . . . in the
employ of the owner or tenant of a farm on which the materials in their raw or natural state were produced" and
''carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations
as distinguished from . . . commercial operations."
Defendants properly rely upon the rationale of California
Emp. Com. v. Butte County Rice Growers Assn., 25 Cal.2d
624 [154 P .2d 892], as determinative of plaintiffs' liability
for contributions under the act. That case involved employees
of an incorporated farmers' cooperative association operating
a warehouse located near a railroad siding for the storage
of rice and grain for shipment to market-services performed
1
' 'Agricultural labor exempted from
'employment' by Section 7 (a)
of the Act includes all services performed:
''a. On a farm, in the employ of any person, in connection with cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting of any
agricultural or horticultural commodity; the raising, feeding, and management of livestock, poultry and bees; which includes among others,
the spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigating and heating
which may be necessary and incident thereto.
''b. In the employ of the ownm or tenant of a farm on which the
materiRis in their raw or natural state were produced, in connection
with the drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, and
marketing of such materials.
''c. In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm with respect to
ordinary farming operations in connection with the operation, management, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of such farm and its
tools and equipment, if substantially all of such services are performed
on a farm.
"d. The provisions of subsection (b) and (c) are not applicable with
respect to the services referred to unless such services are carried on as
an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations. Nor are the provisions of said
subsections applicable to services performed in commercial canning or
eommercial freezing.''
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off the farm following the harvesting of the crops. The assoeiation 's storage and shipping facilities were available not
only to members but also to others upon payment of a nominal
application fee, and under the terms of its state warehouse
license the cooperative was obligated to serve the public in
providing storage accommodations. Under such circumstances
the warehouse was held to be a commercial enterprise, helpful
to but separate and apart from the farming operations, and
the activities of the employees were classified as commercial
rather than agricultural within the concept of the act.
[2a] Plaintiffs seek to avoid the commercial aspect of their
packing-house upon the premise that its principal purpose
was to facilitate the marketing of the crops from the Stivers'
groves. However, the test under the act is not the principal
purpose of the enterprise but whether the services performed
by its employees were ''carried on as an incident to ordinary
farming operations as distinguished from . . . commercial
operations.'' Thus significant is the fact that the packinghouse served the public to the extent of 20 per cent of its
total fruit packing operations, a sizable amount attesting
to its commercial character. Plaintiffs argue that this 20
per cent factor is not of controlling importance, since 80 per
cent of the fruit handled in the packing-house came from
Stivers' groves and such packing services in readying their
own farm products for marketing constituted agricultural
labor. [3] Accordingly, they cite the act's provision for
segregation of the employee's services on a percentage basis
and classification of the aggregate employment by reference
to how "one-half or more" of the employee's time is spent.
(§ 7.1, Stats. 1945, pp. 1486, 2230 2 ; Admin. Code, tit. 22,
§ 42 (b), effective April 1, 1945.) The employer is required
to keep accurate records in segregation of the exempt and nonexempt employment. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 22, § 42 (a) .3 )

"''If the services performed during one-half or more of any pay period
by an employee for the person employing him constitute employment, all
the services of such employee for such period shall be deemed to be
employment; but if the services performed during more than one-half of
any such pay period by an employee for the person employing him do not
constitute employment, then none of the services of such employee for
such period shall be deemed to be employment. .As used in this paragraph the term 'pay period' means a period (of not more than thirty-one
consecutive days) for which a payment of remuneration is ordinarily
made to the 'employee by the person employing him.''
"'Where employees perform services for an employer in both exempt
and nonexempt employments, such employer shall maintain accurate
records showing the hours worked by and the wages paid to employees
in each of said employments. Such segregation must be made with
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But these provisions appear to have been adopted as a reasonable method of determining whether a specific employee or
group of employees, engaged part of the time in exempt work
and part of the time in nonexempt work, is in taxable employment and entitled to the coverage provisions of the
act. They do not apply in favor of an employer who conducts a single integrated operation having a definite commercial aspect, such as the packing-house in question, so as
to exempt such employer from liability for contributions
in any period in which the commercial phase of such single
integrated operation may fall below 50 per cent of the total
operation. A contrary construction would be unreasonable
in view of the broad coverage intended by the act in fixing
taxable employment. (California Emp. Stab. Com. v. Lewis,
68 Cal.App.2d 552, 554 [157 P.2d 38], and cases there cited.)
Accordingly, the comparative percentage measure of the
packing-house services rendered to the public does not remove
the force of that consideration in reflecting the commercial
nature of plaintiffs' packing-house enterprise.
[4] Nor does it matter that here plaintiffs' packing-house
is a partnership rather than a corporate entity as was the
situation in California Emp. Com. v. Butte County Rice
Growers .Assn., sttpra, 25 Cal.2d 624, so that the warehouse
activities were not services performed for the owner or tenant
of a farm within the concept of "agricultural labor" under
the act. To this point plaintiffs maintain that, save in exceptional 'circumstances, a partnership under California law
is not regarded as an entity distinct from the individuals
composing it. (Reed v. Industrial Ace. Com., 10 Cal.2d 191,
192-193 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720] ; Park v. Union Mfg.
Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 401, 407 [114 P.2d 373] .) Accordingly,
they claim that since they constituted the packing-house partnership and also owned the Stivers' groves on which the
citrus fruit was produced, the packing-house employees were
in effect performing services for the owners of the land. In
opposition to plaintiffs' argument, defendants cite the act's
express definition of an "employing unit" to mean "any
individual or type of organization, including any partnership . . . corporation . . . . " ( § 8.5; Stats. 1937, p. 2053;
am. without material changes by Stats. 1947, p. 2627.) Such
provision, they claim, in effect declares that, for the purposes
respect to each individual employee rather than on the basis of the
employer's operations as a whole and may be made on a percentage or
other basis found by the Department to be reasonable.''
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of the act, a partnership is to be regarded as a separate entity.
As a factual consideration indicating the distinct nature of
the packing-house partnership, defendants point out the disproportionate ownership interests therein of the membergrowers of the Stivers' fruit: the four-way Stivers' partnership owning some five-sixths of the total citrus acreage and
two-thirds of the packing-house company; Raymond K. Stivers individually owning one-sixth of the citrus acreage and
one-third of the packing-house company. However, it is
unnecessary to do more than note here the respective contentions as to the ''separate entity'' of plaintiffs' partnership,
for it is the independent factor of the ''commercial nature''
of the packing-house enterprise which we deem sufficient to
establish plaintiffs' liability for the unemployment contributions in question.
[2b] Undoubtedly, services performed in a packing-house
operated by and for the farmer-grower of agricultural products may constitute "agricultural labor" under the act provided "such services are carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from . . . commercial operations.'' But here the producers of the fruit formed
a packing-house partnership which functioned not alone in
their behalf in the marketing process. Rather, the packinghouse also served the public to the substantial extent of 20
per cent of its total fruit packing services. As so operating
for profit on a commercial scale, the packing-house became
a single integrated enterprise operating much the same as any
business concern, and it should not be treated any differently
insofar as bearing its proportionate share of the social responsibilities flowing from the state unemployment insurance law.
Consistent with a liberal construction of the act to effectuate
its intended coverage (California Emp. Com. v. Butte County
Rice Growers Assn., supra, 25 Cal.2d 624, 630), the commercial packing-house labor here involved was not exempt employment. Accordingly, plaintiffs' liability for unemployment
contributions as here assessed cannot be avoided on the facts
alleged in their complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, .T., and Traynor, .T.,
concurred.
CARTER, ,J., Dissenting.-! adopt as my dissenting opinion in this case the able and well reasoned opinion prepared
by Presiding ,Justice Shinn, which was concurred in by Jus-
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tices Wood and Vallee, when this case was before the District
Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three.
"Plaintiffs sued to recover employer's taxes paid under
protest under assessments levied under section 45.11 (d) of
the California Unemployment Insurance Act (Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 8780(d).) The demurrer of James G. Bryant as
Director of Employment and other defendants was sustained
without leave to amend and plaintiffs appeal from the ensuing judgment. The assessments were for the period January 1, 1944, through September 30, 1947, and amounted
to $5,348.20. Plaintiffs pursued all necessary administrative
proceedings prerequisite to court action.
"The labor for which the assessments were levied was
performed in a packing house and the question is whether
it was agricultural labor and hence exempt under the act.
It was alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs Morgan A.
Stivers, Glenn Stivers, Howard Stivers and Raymond K.
Stivers were, during the period in question, members of a
partnership which owns, with numerous other assets, 357 acres
of citrus groves. Subsequently, Raymond K. Stivers died
and J. B. Stivers, as executor of his estate, joins with the
others as a plaintiff. Raymond K. Stivers owned separately
an additional 70 acres of groves. All the property stood in
the name of Morgan A. Stivers or of himself and his wife
and he had the management of all the properties of the partnership. The same four parties owned a packing house and
this was managed by Raymond K. Stivers. Eighty per cent
of the products handled in the packing house came from
Stivers' groves and not over 20 per cent from the groves of
others. The packing house operations were conducted by a
partnership consisting of the four owners of the groves,
Raymond K. Stivers having a one-third interest in this partnership and the other members a two-thirds interest. All
the cost of operating the groves was paid by the packing
house partnership. The several groves were charged with
this expense, and were credited with all the receipts from
products sold, against which was a charge per box for packing, plus an additional charge for the operation and maintenance of the groves owned by Raymond K. Stivers and
those owned by the owning partnership. The packing house
partnership did not operate, maintain or manage any noncitrus groves; the primary and sole purpose of the packing
house partnership was to produce, harvest, pick, sell and
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ship citrus fruits from the Stivers' groves. It was alleged
that two-thirds of the (Stivers) citrus fruits packed were
produced in the groves of the owning partners and one-third
in the groves owned by Raymond K. Stivers.
''Our discussion will be devoted to the following propositions: If the packing house partnership, as distinguished
from its individual members, is to be regarded as a separate
entity, and the employing unit of the packing house workers,
or if the principal packing house operation was not merely
incidental to the farming operation, the labor would not be
agricultural labor under the terms of the act and the regulations of the Department of Employment, whereas, if the
packing house partnership was merely an agency of the
owners of the groves and the individuals who compose both
partnerships were, in reality, the employers, and if the principal packing house operation was merely incidental to the
farming operation, all the labor in the packing house would
be regarded for unemployment tax purposes as agricultural
labor and hence exempt. We are of the opinion that the latter
is the case.
''Section 7 (a) of the act provided that the term 'employment' does not include 'agricultural labor.' The act
did not define agricultural labor. During the year 1944 and
until January 1, 1945, there was in force rule 7.1 of the
department defining agricultural labor and which read as set
out below. 1
"As of April 1, 1945, without material change, rule 7.1 became section 43 of title 22 of the California Administrative
1
''
' Agricultural Labor Defined-The term "Agricultural Labor" includes all services performed:
" '(1) By an employee on a farm, in connection with the cultivation
of the soil, the raising and harvesting of crops, the raising, feeding,
management of livestock, poultry and bees; which includes among others,
the spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigating and heating
which may be necessary and incident thereto;
" '(2) By an employee in connection with the drying, processing,
packing, packaging, transporting, and marketing of materials which are
produced on the farm or articles produced from such materials, providing
such drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, or marketing
is carried on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations.
'' 'The services hereinabove set forth do not constitute agricultural
labor unless they are performed by an employee of the owner or tenant
of the farm on which the materials in their raw or natural state were
produced. Nor do such services constitute agricultural labor if they are
carried on as an incident to manufacturing or commercial operations.' ''
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Code, which was amended June 1, 1945, to read as set out
below. 2
"In California Ernp. Com. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546
[165 P.2d 917], former rule 7.1 was interpreted to mean that
packing house labor, in order to be classed as agricultural,
must be performed by an employee of the owner or tenant
of the farm on which the materials are produced, and the
services must be carried on as an incident to ordinary farming
operations as distinguished from manufacturing or commercial operations. "\Vith somewhat different arrangement,
section 43 of title 22 of the California Administrative Code
imposed the same conditions.
''Inasmuch as 80 per cent of the packing services were performed on Stivers' fruit and 20 per cent on other fruit, certain other enactments are to be considered.
"By Statutes 1939, pages 2850-2853, section 7 of the Unemployment Reserves Act (Stats. 1935, p. 1226) was amended to
read as set out below. 3 The same provision is found in section
""'Agricultural labor exempted from "employment" by Section 7 (a)
of the Act includes all services performed:
'' '(a) On a farm, in the employ of any person, in connection with
cultivating the soil, or in connection with raising or harvesting of any
agricultural or horticultural commodity; the raising, feeding, and management of livestock, poultry and bees, which includes among others, the
spraying, pruning, fumigating, fertilizing, irrigation and heating which
may be necessary and incident thereto.
" '(b) In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm on which the
materials in their raw or natural state were produced, in connection with
the drying, processing, packing, packaging, transporting, and marketing
of such materials.
" '(c) In the employ of the owner or tenant of a farm with respect
to ordinary farming operations in connection with the operation, management, conservation, improvement, or maintenance of such farm and its
tools and equipment, if substantially all of such services are performed
on a farm.
" '(d) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) are not applicable
with respect to the services referred to unless such services are carried
on as an incident to ordinary farming operations as distinguished from
manufacturing or commercial operations. Nor are the provisions of said
subsections applicable to services performed in commercial canning or
commercial freezing.' "
8
"
(1J) 'If the services performed during one-half or more of any
pay period by an employee for the person employing him constitute employment, all the services of such employee for such period shall be
deemed to be employment; but if the services performed during more
than one-half of any such pay period by an employee for the person
employing him do not constitute employment, then none of the services
of such employE'e for such period shall be deemed to be employment. As
used in this paragraph the term ''pay period'' means a period (of not
more than thirty-one consecutive days) for which a payment of remuneration is ordinarily made to the employee of the person employing
him.'''
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7.1 of the act (Stats. 1954, pp. 1486 and 2230; 3 Deering's
Gen. Laws, § 8780 (d)). It also appears as section 42 (b) of
title 22 of the California Administrative Code, effective April
1, 1945, which contains the additional provisions set out
below. 4
. "We may inquire first whether it appeared from the allegations of the complaint as a matter of law that the packing
services were incidental to a commercial operation as distinguished from the farming operation. It was alleged that
they were merely incidental to the latter and we think it may
not be questioned that the facts pleaded would have justified
a finding that this allegation was true. We can conceive of no
reason to doubt that the principal purpose of the packing
house operation was to facilitate the marketing of the crops
from the Stivers' groves.
"Plaintiffs contend that the share of the services amount. ing to 20 per cent rendered to the public was likewise incidental to the farming operation. We deem it unnecessary to
decide this question. Even if it be assumed that the labor per-formed in packing nonStivers fruit, if considered by itself,
would be subject to tax, it should be deemed tax exempt under
former section 7 of the act, which became section 7.1 under the
1945 amendment, for the reason that more than 50 per cent of
the entire service was agricultural. It is therefore immaterial
whether the 20 per cent of services on nonStivers fruit were
agricultural and tax exempt, or nonagricultural and tax subject, inasmuch as the entire service was rendered to the same
employer.
"Exemption from tax liability rests upon the further condition that the packing house laborers were working for the
owners of the groves. \Ve are satisfied that they were.
''Any type of organization, including a partnership, may
become an employing unit ( § 9). So may a partnership be
an owner or a tenant. Granting that the packing house partnership was nominally the employing unit with respect to
the packing house labor, and recognizing that title to the
groves was not vested in the partnership as an entity distinct
from .its members, we cannot fail to recognize the fact that the
'''(a) 'Where employees perform services for an employer in both
exempt and nonexempt employments, such employer shall maintain
accurate records showing the hours worked by and the wages paid to
employees in each of said employments. Such segregation must be made
with respect to each individual employee rather than on the hasis of
the employer's operations as a .whole and may be made on a percentage
or other basis found by the Department to be reasonable.' ''
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groves belonged to the individuals who composed the packing
house partnership. This fact establishes that the individuals
were in a real sense the employers of the workers.
''Defendants say that the decision in California Ernp. Com.
v. Butte County etc. Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624 [154 P.2d 892],
'is vie·wed to be determinative of the present controversy.'
Vv e believe otherwise. The defendant was a cooperative association, incorporated as a nonprofit farmers' organization
under civil code sections. It had 48 members, paying $300
each, and 23 applicants for memberships who had paid $10
each. All were entitled to the handling and marketing ser\'ICes. The association conducted a warehouse business in
which it was obliged to receive and store products offered to
it by the general public without discrimination; it also purchased and sold to its members and applicants, and might
also sell to the public, merchandise commonly used in farming operations; it also maintained a public scale for the use
of the public. Any profits made in its operation were distributed ratably among the regular members. Applicants
for membership received nothing. The association was not the
owner, tenant or operator of any farm. The court said:
'Upon this record the conclusion is inescapable that the defendant association is in essence a commercial enterprise.'
It was claimed for the association that it was a mere agency
through which the members and applicants processed and
marketed their products. The court rejected this claim,
stating (p. 636) : 'Such observation is not only squarely at
variance with the facts of this case-demonstrating that the
defendant association in all its services functions as a unit
wholly independent of the farmers comprising its membership
-but is likewise contrary to the elementary legal principle
that a corporation is a complete legal entity separate and
apart from the individuals who own it.' It was therefore
held that the operation of the various enterprises while helpful, were 'not an incident to ordinary farming operations as
distinguished from . . . commercial operations,' and that the
labor employed therein was not tax exempt. The features
of the operations in that case which the court deemed to be
controlling are absent from the present case. The factual
features of the present case from which we conclude that the
major part of the services here in question was incidental to
a farming operation, were absent from the former case. The
court in that case did not hold, as respondents contend, that
any service rendered to the public would make the running of
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a packing house a commercial operation. It did hold that the
commercial operations of the Rice Growers Association were
not incidental to a farming operation.
''Respondents contend that the Stivers partnership was an
entity separate from the members thereof, just as the Rice
Growers Association was an entity separate from its members. The distinctions are obvious. The principal differences
are that the individuals who composed the two Stivers partnerships were the sole owners of the groves and the packing
house, operated both the farming and the packing operations
through their respective managers, that all the acts of their
managers were the acts of the partners, and all the duties
and obligations of the partnerships the duties and obligations
of the individual members. Certainly it could not be contended that the groves were in an ownership distinct and
separate from that of the individual partners.
''A partnership may be regarded as a legal entity for
some purposes and not for others. It may in its partnership
name become an employer of labor so as to effectively bind its
members, but in doing so it acts on their behalf and not as a
separate entity. The theory that a workman employed by a
partnership is not the employee of each member of the partnership was expressly rejected in Reed v. Industrial Ace.
Corn., 10 Cal.2d 191 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720]. Reed
was employed by a partnership, Gordon and Mellott. Mellott became insured before he formed a partnership with
Gordon. Reed was denied a compensation award against the
insurer on the theory that he was an employee of the partnership, which was not insured. The award was annulled.
The court held that Reed was the employee of the individuals
who composed the partnership and was therefore insured.
We quote from the opinion a passage which we regard as
conclusive on the point: 'The underlying fallacy in respondent's argument is the assumption that the partnership
is a distinct unit, separate from the members thereof. Occasional suggestions of this "entity" theory of partnership
are found in statutes or decisions, but apart from exceptional
·situations, a partnership is not considered an entity, but an
association of individuals. (See First Nat. T. & S. Bank v.
Ind1tstrial Ace. Com., 213 Cal. 322, 331 [2 P.2d 347, 78 A.L.R.
1324] ; 9 Cal.L.Rev. 119.) In consonance with this view, an
employee of a partnership is an employee of each of the
partners, and no individual partner may escape liability to
such employee on the ground that only the partnership and
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not the individuals composing it can be held. It is immaterial
whether the liability of the partners in this situation is joint
and several, or joint, for even in the case of joint liability,
a several judgment may be had against an individual partner
by proper joinder and pleading. (See Palle v. Industrial
Com., 79 Utah 47 [7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222] ; Merchants
Nat. Bank v. Clark-Parker Co., 215 Cal. 296 [9 P.2d 826,
81 A.L.R. 778] .) The result is that W. B. Mellott, a partner
in the firm of Gordon & Mellott, was an employer of petitioner
Reed, and was undoubtedly liable to Reed for workmen's
compensation. Since \V. B. Mellott procured insurance with
respondent company to cover such liability, and paid the required premium therefor, the company must perform its obligation by paying the award.'
''The principle stated is supported by numerous authorities
cited by the court and by many others. This entire line of
authority is ignored in the brief of the respondents, although
it directly supports the contention of the appellants that
they, as individuals, were the real employers of the packing
house workers. Respondents say that the packing house
workers are as much in need of unemployment insurance as
other workers, and apparently contend that this fact should
influence the interpretation of the law by the courts. The
same could be said of all agricultural workers and many others
whose wages are tax exempt. We have only to apply the
law as it is written. The argument of the respondents has
an answer in the Kovacevich case (27 Cal.2d, pp. 549, 550)
where it is said: 'While it is true that such legislation should
be liberally construed so as to afford all the relief which the
language of the act indicates that the Legislature intended to
grant (California Ernp. Corn. v. Butte County Rice Growers
Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624, 630 [154 P.2d 892]), the interpretation
should not exceed the limits of the statutory intent. . . . In
view of the express statutory intent to except ''agricultural
labor," any labor which is essentially agricultural in nature,
and which cannot be otherwise regarded by reason of any
change in the custom of doing it, should not be included within
the operation of the act by administrative or judicial legislation under the guise of liberal interpretation.'
''The requirements that the employer of both exempt and
nonexempt labor must keep the account of each employee so
as to record the time spent in each type of employment in
each pay period ( § 42, title 22, note 4 above) was met by the
allegations of the complaint that such records were kept.

500

HoLM v. SuPERIOR Coum'

[42 C.2d

"We hold that upon proof of the facts pleaded by plaintiffs the court could properly find that plaintiffs were the
employers of the packing house labor ; that not less than 80
per cent of the packing house services were incidental to
ordinary farming operations as distinguished from commercial
operations, and hence were agricultural, and could properly
conclude therefrom that all the wages paid were tax exempt.''
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment
and permit the defendants to answer if they be so advised.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 7,
1954. Carter, ,J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[ S. F. K o. 18781.
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DION R. HOLM, City Attorney, etc., et al., Petitioners, v.
SUPEHIOR COURT FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; WYNONA BELL,
Real Party in Interest.
[1] Appeal- Orders Appealable: Discovery- Prohibition.-An
order granting inspection of documents under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1000, is not appealable, and prohibition is proper remedy to
restrain its enforcement.
[2] Discovery-Bill of Discovery.-Formerly there was no right
in equity to inspect an adversary's documentary evidence.
[3] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-While Code Civ. Proc., § 1000,
relating· to inspection of writings, is based on bill of discovery
in chancery courts, the former equitable rule against inspection
of documentary evidence does not establish a limitation on
scope of code section.
[4] !d.-Discovery Under Code.-Where use of statutory bill of
discovery is denied by our courts it usually is because in[3] See Cal.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 3; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 8 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 34; Discover},
§ 7; [2] Discovery,§ 1; [3-9, 17, 18] Discovery,§ 2; [10]. Witnesses,
§ 74; [11, 13] Witnesses, § 76(2); [12] Witnesses, § 76(1); r14,
19-21] Witnesses, § 76(3); [15, 16] Witnesses, § 77; [22] \Vitnesses, § 74.

